By Samindra Kunti
May 19 – In the vicinity of the iconic Arc de Triomphe in Paris’s affluent eighth district, football fans milled about the entrance of the ritzy Hotel du Collectioneur under a slight drizzle late in March. They were looking to get a glimpse of Brazil’s football stars. Chelsea’s Oscar briefly sauntered through the plush lobby, a little casual in his flip-flops. Heads turned and outside pandemonium ensued.
That evening Brazil would tear apart hosts France in a clinical performance in the presence of a bumper crowd of 81,338 at the Stade de France. Oscar canceled out Raphael Varane’s early header with a cheeky toe poke past Steve Mandanda. In the second half Neymar single-handedly won the game with two goals. It was another step forward in Brazil’s renaissance as a global superpower after the unforgiving 7-1 World Cup humiliation against Germany.
A few days later the scene shifted to a swanky hotel at London’s Park Lane. This time only Filipe Luis and Neymar’s fathers strolled around the lobby. Brazil would go on to beat South American rivals Chile at a packed Emirates stadium. Many fans wore the yellow shirt as an expression of their affection for the five-time world champions. They also highlighted the global attraction that Brazil still holds for football aficionados.
“You are not playing against the current [world] champions,” says Jamil Chade, the European correspondent of O Estado de São Paulo. “You are playing against history.”
Brazil and excellence in football have always been synonymous. An American satellite beamed the 1970 Mexico World Cup final between Italy and Brazil to a billion households in color. Carlos Alberto Torres’s spectacular goal became part of the audience’s imagination.
“The Brazilians at their finest gave us pleasure so natural and deep as to be a vivid physical experience … it was the apogee of soccer,” wrote Hugh McIlvanney in his match report for the Sunday Times on June 21 1970.
The idea of a global Brazilian team was born. Sportswear manufacturer Nike translated that idea into a brand in the 1990s. Ronaldo and Romario juggled their way through a busy airport in a flashy commercial to the scorching tunes of Mas que Nada. Nike’s dream team failed, however, at the 1998 World Cup.
Ricardo Teixeira, then boss of the Brazilian Football Confederation (CBF), ensured that the commercial trend continued. He wanted to make the Seleção his very own money-making machine. Swiss-based company Kentaro also wanted a piece of the cake and teamed up with him. Kentaro organised a carnivalesque training camp for Brazil ahead of the 2006 World Cup in the Alpine village of Weggis. Fans were sometimes charged $100 for a chance to watch them live.
“Coach [Carlos] Parreira said, ‘We have to leave’,” recounts Chade. “Someone said, ‘We have a contract, we can’t.’ The team was furious.”
Kentaro sent Brazil to Dortmund, Boston, Doha and Libreville to entertain Turkey, Mexico, England and Gabon respectively, but the happy marriage between the CBF and the Swiss group did not last. Teixeira decided the time had come to join forces with a new partner and Sandro Rosell, then president of FC Barcelona, introduced him to ISE, a subsidiary of the secretive Dallah Al Baraka group, a Middle Eastern conglomerate with 38,000 employees worldwide.
The Folha de São Paulo newspaper managed to get its hands on the contract and disclosed a curiosity: ISE paid the CBF $805 000, 32.6% less than what Kentaro had offered the CBF for a contract renewal. ISE delegated the responsibility of executing the contract to British-based Pitch International.
Pitch International now deals with the entire organisation of Brazil’s friendly matches: from production for the Globo TV network to sponsorship and, more importantly, as is stated on the company’s website, opponent selection. The company has the right to do so until 2022.
In the post-World Cup era, Pitch International has catapulted the Brazilians into a stratosphere of global entertainers. They have racked up more than 65,000km (calculated from São Paulo), playing in Miami, New York, Beijing, Singapore, London and Paris.
“It’s a business,” says TV Globo journalist Mauro Naves, who undertook the arduous 30-hour hike to China. “The players have become of secondary consideration. The decisions are not made in their best interests.”
In the Far East, coach Dunga vented his dissatisfaction with the organisation of the friendlies. His predecessor, Luiz Felipe Scolari, also alluded to the set-up by Pitch International when he spoke about the problematic travel times to the Far East and the corresponding time difference in 2011.
The players seem less concerned. “Playing against adversaries [everywhere] is good,” says Coutinho. “You gain experience and your football evolves.” Willian, of Chelsea, echoes his colleague’s political correctness or demonstrates the same lack of awareness. “Brazil always plays well in every corner of the world and receives the adulation of the fans,” he says.
For Chade, Pitch International is a clone of Kentaro. “[They] sell a product, the Brazilian team. You maximise the image and the profit of the team. Brazil is a public good but it’s run by a private company.”
“That’s the divide between who the team is and who makes profit with it,” Chade says. “It’s the hijacking of emotions – your emotions, my emotions – and transforming it into profit.”
Now Chade and O Estado de São Paulo have obtained documents that prove Brazil’s globetrotting doesn’t serve footballing interests, but rather benefits the autocrats at the top of the CBF. Pitch International maintains an official line that it’s first and foremost concerned with Brazil as a football team.
The disclosed documents reveal a deeply-fraught contract between the CBF and ISE, with headquarters at the Westwing building, Harbour Drive, P.O. Box 1111, Georgetown, Grand Cayman. When Ricardo Teixeira renewed the deal for another decade in 2011, the contract, for the first time, stipulated that Brazil must always play their strongest team – with the Ronaldinhos and Neymars who have enchanted the world, but who also represent the highest marketing value.
“CBF will guarantee and ensure that A Team players that are playing in official competitions will participate in any and every match,” reads article 9.1 If the CBF violates this stipulation, it will only receive 50 percent of the normal $1.05 million match fee.
When a player does not make the squad due to injury the CBF has to provide ISE with a medical certificate, proving that the concerned player is physically unfit. “In this case, the CBF will endeavor to substitute new players of a similar level in relation to marketing value, technical ability and reputation,” states the contract.
The CBF has rejected any of the allegations made by O Estado de São Paulo, saying the report raises “unfounded suspicions.” In a statement the CBF declares that it ‘did not sell’ the Brazilian national team, deeming the accusations ‘infantile insinuations.’
“The CBF affirms that the criteria of player’s selection for the games of the Brazilian national team is and will always be technical. The best active players play and will always play,” read the statement.
ISE voiced its displeasure in 2011 when then coach Mano Menezes rested star players Neymar, Paulo Henrique Ganso and Kaka among other for a friendly away to Gabon. It begs the question as to how much freedom Brazil’s coach has to select his players free from outside pressure and secondary considerations?
Carlos Dunga’s call-up of Robinho and Ricardo Kaka, on the reserve list, for the upcoming Copa America raised some eyebrows, but the contract between the CBF and ISE doesn’t extend to official matches and tournaments. South America’s flagship event serves as a warm-up for the grueling World Cup qualifiers, which commence in autumn. So at least for now, ‘circus Brazil’ won’t hijack the emotions of global football fans.
Contact the writer of this story at moc.l1735873785labto1735873785ofdlr1735873785owedi1735873785sni@i1735873785tnuk.1735873785ardni1735873785mas1735873785