By Andrew Warshaw and Paul Nicholson
September 10 – The man charged with overseeing FIFA’s reform process has released details of a thorough and radical blueprint designed to overhaul the organisation’s powers of responsibility and bring an end to the atmosphere of mistrust and the stench of corruption that has plagued world football’s governing body.
Expressing the need for “root and branch” change, Domenico Scala, chairman of FIFA’s independent Audit and Compliance committee, has published a concrete eight-point plan, first submitted to FIFA in July as a discussion document but never made public in full, which firmly identifies FIFA’s executive committee “and the conduct of its members” as the root of the organisation’s problems.
Scala’s 25-page report is a mix of the expected – more rigorous integrity checks, terms limits for all senior personnel, disclosure of precise compensation and already-approved revised World Cup bidding rules and regulations – and the less expected. Notable among these is a recommendation for FIFA’s full 209-member Congress to elect exco members in the future and term limits being extended to individual federations as a pre-condition for membership of Fifa bodies in order to strengthen accountability. Whether the second of these is either realistic or enforceable, however, must be open to question.
“The reforms described in this present report have not started from scratch, but, much more, can – and have had to – build on what has already been achieved,” writes Scala.
“There is no particular reason to start a fundamental rethink of (or to ‘revolutionise’) the structures and procedures within FIFA.” Yet the reality is that the recommendations are, in FIFA terms, a complete restructuring of the old power base. Scala identifies the exco as “one of the most problematic hotspots within the FIFA organisation and structure” and says it needs to put FIFA first, something it has not been good at, implying that regional requirements have tended to override a wider global priority.
“The executive committee essentially needs to neglect the ‘Confederation perspective’ in discussions and resolutions on the reforms that have become necessary and focus stronger on the interests and well-being of FIFA as a whole than has been the case to date,” he writes. “The Executive Committee has too many powers and competences and is de facto more powerful than the Congress.”
As a result, Scala proposes ripping up the current exco format and dividing it into two separate bodies: a Governing Body dealing with strategic matters and supervision and a Management Board looking after executive functions. Composition of the Governing Body will include stakeholders from outside FIFA.
Scala says the influence and power playing of the confederations needs to be divorced from the decision taking at FIFA.
“FIFA is an association of (currently 209) national football associations but is at present heavily influenced by the Confederations – who are not FIFA members.
“This influence has not always served FIFA well. The members of the FIFA Executive Committee need to be reminded that they are representatives of a body of the association, or federation, FIFA and that they are being perceived as such. In future this notion needs to be reflected much stronger particularly in the conduct of FIFA Executive Committee members. The interests of the Confederations and those of FIFA overall need to be separated more strictly.”
Expressing the need to end what he describes as “the existence of ‘old boys’ networks'” Scala’s report also includes a recommendation to stop officials holding multiple “double or even triple” functions that could lead to conflicts of interest.
“The misconduct of some, even if it happens ‘only’ at Confederation/national association level, has a tremendous impact on FIFA itself or as a whole (this includes loss of image, financial loss [as a consequence of losing sponsors, for example]). FIFA and the members of the Executive Committee need to be better protected against the effects of potential misconduct of Executive Committee members and other officials at all levels of their activities.”
The next critical date is the December exco meeting when Scala’s reforms will be approved, or otherwise, ahead of the February 26 election Congress when it is hoped they will be on the agenda and given the green light for implementation. That, of course, is when Sepp Blatter, who wants to leave a positive legacy, steps down and it remains to be seen whether his successor will be comfortable with Scala’s proposals.
“These measures represent a practical approach to the reform proposals, which are necessary in order to be able to bring FIFA back on the path of integrity and credibility,” Scala insisted.
Scala’s eight-point plan is as follows:
1 . Enhanced and centralised integrity checks
• Integrity checks performed by the Investigatory Chamber of the FIFA Ethics Committee with regard to all members of the present Executive Committee and other holders of positions in key FIFA bodies (and respective candidates)
• Enhancement and material expansion of the integrity checks
• Introduction of an obligation for Confederations and Member Associations to establish integrity checks with regard to positions in their top governing bodies as a precondition for eligibility
2. Introduction of Term limits
• Limitation of the mandate of the President, the (other) members of the Executive Committee, the Secretary General and members of independent committees to three terms of office (each of four years)
• Introduction of an obligation for Confederations and Member Associations to establish equivalent limitations (precondition for eligibility)
3. Direct election of FIFA Executive Committee members by the Congress
• The members of the FIFA Executive Committee (as well as, possibly, of other FIFA governing bodies or committees) to be directly elected by the FIFA Congress
• Confederations will retain a right to propose candidates
4. Disclosure of individual compensations
• Individual and detailed disclosure of the remunerations of the President, the other members of the FIFA Executive Committee, the Secretary General and (at least) of the Chair-men of the independent committees
• All football-related income and compensations must be disclosed comprehensively
• Detailed disclosure only vis-à-vis FIFA internally; the FIFA financial report will merely feature listings by certain categories
5. Increased efficiency and enhanced independence of Standing Committees
• Significant reduction of the number and size of the standing committees
• Committees that bear a high risk of conflicts of interests occurring must have independent chairmen
6. Introduction of higher standards of governance at Confederation and member association levels
• If they have not already done so, Confederations and FIFA member associations have to issue adequate ethics and disciplinary regulations and set up the bodies required to implement them
• Confederations and FIFA member associations have to comply with high standards of governance based on relevant ‘best practice’
• All persons assigned to FIFA bodies have to pass strict integrity checks in their respective Confederations and national associations
7. Revised World Cup bidding rules and procedures
• No additional proposals, since this bundle of measures has already been adopted and is now merely to be (further) implemented
8. Improvements regarding FIFA’s organisation and structure
• More clear and strict separation of strategic decision-making, or supervisory competences respectively, and performance of day-to-day business
• Division of the present Executive Committee into two separate bodies: a Governing Body (strategic matters, supervision) and a Management Board (executive functions)
• Composition of the Governing Body will be similar to the one applicable to the present Executive Committee; however, representation of the Confederations will be modified and other stakeholders from outside FIFA will be involved. Further improvement of financial control mechanisms, in particular with regard to development funds. More clear and strict separation of sports-related and commercial competences and matters, in particular by establishing a Commercial Board and a Development Board (both independent bodies).
Contact the writer of this story at moc.l1734901743labto1734901743ofdlr1734901743owedi1734901743sni@n1734901743osloh1734901743cin.l1734901743uap1734901743 or moc.l1734901743labto1734901743ofdlr1734901743owedi1734901743sni@w1734901743ahsra1734901743w.wer1734901743dna1734901743